HISTOKf  I 


'he  League  of  Nations 

and 

Freedom  of  the  Seas 

BY 

SIR  JULIAN  CORBETT 


OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON     EDINBURGH     GLASGOW     NEW  YORK 

TORONTO  MELBOURNE   CAPE  TOWN    BOMBAY 

HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

1918 

Threepence  Net 


The  League  of  Nations 

and 

Freedom  of  the  Seas 

BY 

SIR  JULIAN  CORBETT 


OXFORD   UNIVERSITY   PRESS 

LONDON     EDINBURGH     GLASGOW     NEW  YORK 

TORONTO  MELBOURNE  CAPETOWN  BOMBAY 

HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

1918 


JflSTOBf 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 
AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS 

THE  conception  of  a  League  of  Nations  in  the 
shape  it  has  taken  during  the  past  few  years  is 
marked  by  a  feature  which  distinguishes  it  from  all 
its  predecessors.  For  the  first  time  it  appears  to  be 
assumed  that  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  abolition  of  belligerent  rights  afloat,  is  an  essential 
condition  of  such  a  League,  and  that  the  two  ideas 
are  inseparable,  an  assumption  which  carries  the 
scope  of  recent  proposals  distinctly  beyond  the  limits 
of  those  to  which  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  gave  birth. 

None  of  those  schemes  ever  gathered  strength  to 
rise  from  the  ground,  yet  none  of  them  ever  burdened 
itself  with  such  a  load  as  those  of  the  present  day  are 
expected  to  carry.  Indeed  Freedom  of  the  Seas  in 
the  ordinary  acceptance  of  the  term  is  more  than 
a  load.  A  frank  examination  of  what  it  connotes 
will  show  that  it  must  be  a  spoke  in  the  wheels  which 
in  all  probability  would  prevent  any  conceivable 
machinery  of  a  League  from  acting  with  effect.  Once 
formed,  a  League  of  Nations  may  be  charged  with  the 
definition  of  belligerent  rights  at  sea  and  with  control 

389267 


4  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

of  their  exercise,  but  without  them  it  cannot  be  an 
effective  instrument  for  peace. 

Striking  as  the  new  development  is  it  has  received 
too  little  attention.  It  has  been  allowed  to  slip  in 
almost  without  comment,  and  few,  if  any,  of  those 
who  of  late  have  been  publicly  discussing  the  subject 
have  stopped  to  inquire  why  the  new  feature  has 
intruded  itself  at  this  particular  juncture.  Its  cre- 
dentials are  not  asked  for.  Yet  obviously  its  sudden 
appearance  needs  explanation  if  we  are  to  obtain 
a  clear  understanding  of  the  trend  of  opinion  as  it 
exists  to-day. 

The  explanation  is  not  far  to  seek.  A  glance  at 
the  history  of  the  whole  movement  reveals  it  at  once. 
It  is  that  the  more  recent  development  of  the  old 
idea  of  a  League  of  Nations  is  the  result  of  a  fusion 
of  two  schools  of  thought.  The  older  one,  whose 
object  was  a  league  to  prevent  war,  culminated  in  the 
Holy  Alliance.  The  newer  one  is  that  which  grew 
up  after  the  failure  of  the  Holy  Alliance  had  led  men 
to  despair  of  finding  a  means  for  the  prevention  of 
war.  The  new  school,  whose  harvest  was  the  Declara- 
tion of  Paris  and  the  Geneva  and  Hague  Conventions, 
sought  the  more  modest  goal  of  mitigating  the  horrors 
of  war.  It  is  to  this  school  of  thought  and  not  to  the 
older  one  that  the  idea  of  Freedom  of  the  Seas  belongs. 
It  indeed  represents  the  high-water  mark  of  what 
may  be  called  the  Hague  school.  It  is  the  creed 
of  its  most  advanced  and  enthusiastic  advocates. 


AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  5 

Naturally  these  men  were  also  among  the  most 
earnest  and  convinced  advocates  of  the  revived  move- 
ment for  a  League  of  Nations.  Their  support  was 
needed  to  give  it  life.  The  price  of  their  support 
was  the  incorporation  of  their  special  policy  in  the 
new  programme.  The  price  was  gladly  paid ;  but,  at 
first,  it  certainly  was  not  measured.  The  failure  to 
diagnose  the  full  meaning  of  Freedom  of  the  Seas, 
and  the  even  deeper  failure  to  penetrate  the  actualities 
of  Naval  Warfare,  prevented  men  observing  how  far 
the  two  conceptions  were  incompatible,  if  not  mutually 
destructive. 

As  every  one  knows,  Freedom  of  the  Seas  is  an 
expression  very  loosely  used,  and  with  many  shades 
of  meaning,  but  for  practical  purposes  it  is  enough  to 
fix  its  content,  as  conceived  by  those  who  imported  it 
into  the  programme  for  a  League  of  Nations.  The 
moment  we  endeavour  to  do  this  we  are  confronted 
by  a  paradox.  It  is  obvious  that  Freedom  of  the 
Seas  can  only  relate  to  a  state  of  war.  In  time  of 
peace  all  seas  are  free.  Since  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  when  the  Baltic  and  Black  Seas 
were  finally  thrown  open  to  commerce,  there  has  been 
no  mare  clausum,  and  except  for  such  international 
regulations  as  have  been  agreed  upon  for  the  safety  and 
facility  of  navigation,  all  men  are  free  to  pass  the  seas 
at  their  pleasure.  It  is  only  in  relation  to  a  state  of 
war  that  there  are  any  restrictions.  If  then  a  League 
of  Nations  can  attain  its  object  in  preventing  war  the 


6  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

question  of  Freedom  of  the  Seas  does  not  arise.  As 
an  article  in  the  programme  it  is  redundant  and 
paradoxical. 

The  truth  is  that  even  the  most  devoted  and 
sanguine  advocates  of  a  League  of  Peace  realize  that 
a  complete  extinction  of  war  by  that  means  is  not 
to  be  expected.  It  is  more  than  can  be  believed — 
at  least  until  human  nature  has  mellowed  much 
farther — that  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  will  bind 
themselves  never  to  go  to  war  for  any  cause  whatever, 
or  entirely  to  abandon  force  as  a  means  of  defending 
themselves  against  attack.  There  must  arise  cases  in 
which  a  League  of  Nations  could  not  prevent  war, 
and  would  not  deem  it  just  to  prevent  it ;  and  it  is 
presumably  to  meet  such  exceptional  cases  that  Free- 
dom of  the  Seas  has  become  attached  to  the  League 
of  Nations.  The  intention  doubtless  is  at  once  to 
mitigate  the  severity  of  the  struggle  as  between  the 
intractable  belligerents  and  prevent  the  contest  inter- 
fering with  those  who  are  no  party  to  it.  If  this 
were  the  end  of  the  proposed  restriction  nothing  but 
good  could  come  of  it,  and  it  would  in  no  way  be 
incompatible  with  the  active  existence  of  a  League 
of  Nations ;  but  we  have  only  to  examine  the  actuali- 
ties of  Naval  Warfare  and  the  effect  which  Freedom  of 
the  Seas  would  have  upon  them  to  see  that  it  is  very 
far  from  the  end.  Its  effect  would  reach  much 
farther. 

As  used  by  its  most  pronounced  advocates,  Freedom 


AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  7 

of  the  Seas  denotes  the  abolition  of  the  right  of 
capturing  private  property  afloat.  They  would  deny 
to  belligerents  not  only  the  admitted  right  to  capture 
neutral  property  under  the  law  of  blockade  and  con- 
traband, but  would  also  make  the  trade  of  the 
belligerents  equally  immune,  either  altogether  or  in 
so  far  as  it  was  not  contraband — that  is  to  say,  that 
no  matter  how  fiercely  navies  contend  peaceful 
merchants  and  fishermen  shall  be  free  to  go  about 
their  business  as  though  no  war  were  in  progress. 

What  such  a  revolution  would  mean  to  Naval 
Warfare  is  clearly  not  recognized,  presumably  because 
of  the  obscurity  which  for  landsmen  has  always 
surrounded  it.  No  such  curtailment  of  belligerent 
rights  has  ever  been  suggested  for  the  land.  It  is 
obvious  to  every  one  that  if  in  time  of  war  peaceful 
merchants  and  husbandmen  were  allowed  to  go  their 
way  unmolested  by  requisitions  and  free  to  pass 
where  they  would,  armies  could  obtain  no  results. 
Even  if  battles  could  be  fought  at  all,  they  could  lead 
to  nothing.  Battles  are  fought  not  for  their  own 
sake  or  merely  to  destroy  the  enemy's  forces.  Their 
ultimate  object  is  the  power  which  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy's  means  of  resistance  gives  for  so  paralysing 
his  national  life  that  he  has  no  choice  but  to  submit. 
If  non-combatants  and  private  property  were  immune 
from  interference  the  nation  could  not  be  coerced  nor 
the  fruits  of  victory  garnered. 

With  the  less  familiar  contests  on  the  sea,  this  has 


8  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

never  been  so  self-evident.  To  the  great  majority  of 
landsmen,  Naval  Warfare  seems  a  far-off  struggle  in 
which  fleets  contend  in  defence  of  their  coasts  and 
cruisers  prowl  for  booty.  It  is  not  generally  under- 
stood that  fleets  exist  mainly  to  give  those  cruisers 
liberty  of  action  against  the  enemy's  commerce,  nor 
that,  unless  the  cruisers  can  push  their  operations  so 
far  as  actually  to  choke  the  enemy's  national  life  at 
sea,  no  amount  of  booty  they  may  get  will  avail  to 
bring  the  war  to  an  end.  It  is  only  by  the  prevention 
of  enemy's  commerce  that  fleets  can  exercise  the 
pressure  which  armies  seek,  in  theory  or  practice,  to 
exercise  through  victories  ashore ;  and  it  is  only  by 
the  capture  and  ability  to  capture  private  property 
at  sea  that  prevention  of  commerce  can  be  brought 
about.  W  ithout  the  right  to  capture  private  property, 
Naval  battles  become  meaningless  as  a  method  of 
forcing  the  enemy  to  submit.  Without  that  right 
a  Naval  victory  can  give  nothing  but  security  at 
home  and  the  power  of  harrying  the  enemy's  un- 
defended coasts — a  form  of  pressure  which  no  one 
would  care  to  sanction  in  these  latter  days. 

It  comes  then  to  this — that  if  Freedom  of  the  Seas 
is  pushed  to  its  logical  conclusion  of  forbidding  alto- 
gether the  capture  and  destruction  of  private  property 
at  sea,  it  will  in  practice  go  far  to  rob  fleets  of  all 
power  of  exerting  pressure  on  an  enemy,  while  armies 
would  be  left  in  full  enjoyment  of  that  power.  The 
balance  of  Naval  and  Military  power,  which  has 


AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  9 

meant  so  much  for  the  liberties  of  the  world,  would 
be  upset,  and  the  voice  of  the  Naval  Powers  would 
sink  to  a  whisper  beside  that  of  the  Military  Powers. 
If  this  is  the  forbidding  situation  to  which  a  League 
of  Nations  is  to  lead — and  there  is  no  avoiding  it  if 
it  is  to  be  clogged  with  full  Freedom  of  the  Seas — 
how  can  it  be  expected  that  the  Great  Naval  Powers 
will  consent  to  become  parties  to  it  ?  Yet  it  is  amongst 
those  Powers  that  are  found  the  most  weighty  and 
convinced  advocates  of  a  League  of  Nations.  Without 
their  cordial  support  such  a  League  can  never  be 
formed,  and  that  is  one  reason  why,  if  we  persist  in 
coupling  the  League  with  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  we 
lay  upon  it  a  load  it  can  never  lift. 

But  it  is  not  the  only  reason.  For  even  if  we 
assume  that  the  League  could  be  formed  with  this 
difficult  condition  attached  to  it,  it  would  still  find 
itself  deprived  of  the  most  effective  means  of  attaining 
its  end.  All  schemes  for  a  League  of  Nations  contem- 
plate some  form  of  sanction  by  which  recalcitrant 
Powers  can  be  coerced,  and  of  all  these  sanctions  the 
one  that  is  at  once  the  most  readily  applied  and  the 
most  immediate  and  humane  in  its  action  is  to  deny 
to  the  offender  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  to  pronounce 
against  him  a  sea  interdict.  To  kill,  or  even  seriously 
to  hamper,  a  nation's  commercial  activity  at  sea  has 
always  been  a  potent  means  of  bringing  it  to  reason, 
even  when  national  life  was  far  less  dependent  on 
sea-borne  trade  than  it  is  now.  At  the  present  time, 


10  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

when  the  whole  world  has  become  to  so  large  an 
extent  possessed  of  a  common  vitality,  when  the  life 
of  every  nation  has  become  more  or  less  linked  by  its 
trade  arteries  with  that  of  every  other,  the  force  of 
an  oecumenical  sea  interdict  has  become  perhaps  the 
most  potent  of  all  sanctions.  It  is,  moreover,  one 
that  can  be  applied  without  inflicting  the  inhumanities 
which  other  forms  of  coercion  entail.  For  a  League, 
therefore,  whose  object  is  to  make  an  end  of  the 
inhuman  practice  of  war  it  is  a  sanction  which  it 
would  be  folly  to  deny  itself.  Yet  if  absolute  Free- 
dom of  the  Seas  is  to  be  a  fundamental  article  of  its 
constitution  that  sanction  cannot  be  applied.  There 
would  still,  of  course,  remain  the  sanction  of  non- 
intercourse,  but  without  the  full  sea  interdict  it  would 
lose  more  than  half  its  force,  and  often  be  too  slow 
and  weak  in  its  action  to  be  effective.  In  too  many 
cases  the  only  trustworthy  sanction  would  still  be 
open  war,  in  which  armies  alone  could  bring  vital 
pressure  to  bear. 

To  bring  the  truth  of  this  view  home  to  those  who 
are  unfamiliar  with  the  mystery  of  sea-power  is  no 
easy  task.  To  many  it  will  seem  to  be  no  more  than 
an  obscurant  clinging  to  the  past  with  which  they  are 
resolved  to  break ;  and  naturally  enough,  when  we 
remember  how  often  opposition  to  human  progress  is 
little  else.  But  in  this  case  the  charge  of  mere 
obscurantism  will  not  hold.  The  latest  expressions 
of  considered  opinion  are  too  weighty  and  too 


AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  11 

sagacious  to  be  so  easily  dismissed.  The  reality  of 
the  objection  to  fettering  a  League  of  Nations  with 
absolute  Freedom  of  the  Seas  has  recently  been 
recognized  by  a  high  authority  whom  no  one  can 
suspect  of  obscurantism.  President  Wilson,  in  his 
original  pronouncement  for  a  League  of  Nations, 
described  his  aim  as  '  a  universal  association  of  nations 
to  maintain  inviolate  the  security  of  the  highway  of 
the  seas  for  the  common  unhindered  use  of  all  the 
nations  of  the  world '.  The  high  seas  were  to  be  open 
to  all,  in  .war  as  in  peace,  at  all  times  and  under  all 
conditions.  But  that  was  in  the  early  days  of  the 
war,  when  men  had  not  yet  had  driven  home  to  them 
what  sea- power  actually  meant  for  the  cause  of  peace 
and  freedom  and  for  the  punishment  of  international 
criminality.  In  his  message  to  Congress  delivered  on 
January  8, 1918,  his  attitude  was  profoundly  modified. 
He  then  took  occasion  to  utter  an  implicit  warning 
that  the  original  position  of  the  promoters  of  a  League 
of  Nations  which  he  had  voiced  on  the  previous 
occasion  was  incompatible  with  their  aim.  The 
substance  of  the  message  was  a  Peace  programme, 
and  its  second  article  provided  for  '  absolute  freedom 
of  navigation  upon  the  seas  outside  territorial  waters 
alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as  the  seas  may  be 
closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  international  action  for 
the  enforcement  of  international  covenants'.  The 
declaration  is  perfectly  clear.  The  official  policy  of 
the  United  States  is  that  the  old  belligerent  rights  at 


12  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

sea  must   be  retained  as  essential  to  the  executive 
ability  of  the  League. 

Obviously  it  must  be  so.  For  if  those  rights  were 
abolished  the  Sea  Powers  as  such  could  do  nothing  to 
enforce  the  will  of  the  League.  The  executive  force 
would  lie  almost  entirely  with  the  Military  Powers, 
and  the  result  of  such  unequal  executive  capacity 
cannot  be  contemplated  with  equanimity.  It  is  too 
well  known  that  the  weight  of  a  voice  in  the  council 
chamber  is  not  determined  by  reason  alone,  but  in 
a  much  higher  degree  by  the  force  behind  it.  The 
Naval  Powers,  bound  hand  and  foot  with  the  Freedom 
of  the  Seas,  could  speak,  but  they  could  not  act,  and 
inevitably  the  councils  of  the  League  would  be  domi- 
nated by  the  Military  Powers.  Is  it  credible  that  in 
the  existing  state  of  human  progress  a  League  of 
Nations  under  such  conditions  could  make  for  the 
sanctity  of  covenants,  the  rights  of  small  nations,  and 
the  peace  of  the  world1?  Clearly  it  is  not,  and  no  less 
clear  is  it  that  if  we  are  in  earnest  for  a  League  of 
Peace  we  must  concentrate  on  that  end,  and  not  dis- 
sipate energy  in  trying  to  achieve  a  wholly  distinct 
aim  at  the  same  time.  To  strive  for  a  League  of 
Peace  is  to  strive  to  prevent  war ;  to  strive  for  Free- 
dom of  the  Seas  is  to  admit  war  and  strive  to  mitigate 
its  terrors.  Let  us  cease  to  confuse  the  two  ends. 
Let  us  determine  which  line  of  endeavour  we  mean  to 
follow,  and  pursue  it  with  singleness  of  purpose  and 
undivided  effort.  It  will  not  be  easy.  It  is  to  the 


AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  13 

interest  of  the  Military  Powers  to  confuse  the  two 
tracks.  They  will,  undoubtedly,  use  every  device  to 
keep  them  confused,  for  only  by  fostering  the  unhappy 
confusion  which  well-meaning  men  have  hastily  intro- 
duced can  they  destroy  the  balance  between  Naval 
and  Military  Powers,  and  so  become  the  arbiters  of 
the  destinies  of  their  weaker  neighbours. 

Above  all  should  these  smaller  nations  beware  of 
putting  themselves  in  line  on  this  question  with  the 
Military  Powers.  The  temptation  is  great.  Their 
sufferings  as  neutrals  during  the  present  war  have 
been  so  severe  that  their  tendency  is  to  snatch  at  the 
first  means  that  seems  to  promise  relief  in  the  future. 
Their  troubles  are  directly  traced  to  the  extension  of 
belligerent  interference  upon  the  sea  to  which  new 
developments  in  war  conditions  have  inevitably  led, 
and  it  is  naturally  in  Freedom  of  the  Seas  they  see 
the  only  remedy.  But  in  truth  their  sufferings  at  sea 
are  only  a  symptom  of  the  underlying  cause.  The 
fundamental  difficulty  is  that  the  vitality  of  nations 
has  become  so  much  a  common  vitality  that  no  nation 
can  fully  enjoy  a  state  of  peace  while  other  nations 
are  at  war.  Neutrality  as  it  formerly  existed  has 
ceased  to  be  possible,  and  Freedom  of  the  Seas  would 
be  only  an  alleviation,  not  a  cure.  The  only  real 
remedy  is  a  League  of  Nations  which  would  prevent 
war,  but  a  League  of  Nations  could  not  permit 
neutrality  as  a  right — any  more  than  by  the  English 
common  law  a  citizen  had  the  right  to  stand  aside  when 


14  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

a  criminal  was  being  pursued.  Except  in  case  of  special 
dispensation  all  would  have  to  join  in  enforcing  the  sea 
interdict,  and  all  would  be  in  a  state  of  war  with  the 
recalcitrant  Power. 

Whether,  then,  a  League  of  Nations  were  formed  or 
not  small  nations  would  not  see  the  end  of  suffering 
or  sacrifice,  even  if  it  were  possible  by  a  stroke  of  the 
pen  to  abolish  so  old  and  well-established  a  practice 
as  capture  at  sea.  On  the  other  hand,  if  no  League 
could  be  formed,  or,  being  formed,  could  not  be  made 
effective,  their  condition  would  be  more  precarious 
than  ever.  For  without  belligerent  rights  at  sea  the 
Naval  Powers  would  be  without  means  to  protect 
them,  and  they  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  Military 
Powers  with  no  one  to  whom  they  could  turn  in  time 
of  trouble. 

For  the  Minor  Powers  there  is  only  one  escape  from 
the  miseries  of  war,  and  that  is  an  effective  League  of 
Nations.  The  policy  which,  in  common  with  all  men  of 
goodwill,  they  must  pursue  is  to  see  it  accomplished,  to 
remove  everything  that  is  likely  to  prove  a  stumbling- 
block,  and  to  permit  nothing  which  may  cripple  its 
vigour  when  it  comes  to  life.  The  seas  our  ship  will 
have  to  pass  are  stormy  and  full  of  shoals,  and  of  this 
we  may  be  sure,  there  is  little  hope  of  her  avoiding 
wreck  if  she  is  made  to  labour  with  this  perilous  deck- 
load  of  Freedom  of  Seas.  If  it  is  our  real  desire  to 
bring  her  safely  to  port  it  must  be  jettisoned — and 
the  sooner  and  more  completely  it  is  done  the  better. 


AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  15 

Only  in  this  way  can  we  cease  to  confuse  the 
issue.  The  all-important  end  is  to  get  a  League  into 
being.  Until  it  is  a  living  fact  we  cannot  tell  what 
form  it  will  take  or  how  much  of  humanity  it  will 
embrace,  and  until  we  know  these  things  we  cannot 
tell  how  far  the  preservation  of  belligerent  rights  at 
sea,  or  to  what  extent  their  control  by  the  League, 
will  make  for  the  success  of  the  Great  Cause. 


The  Leagf10  ^ 


THE  LEAGUE 
GREY  OF  FALLC 

THE  LEAGUJ 
COMING  RL 
POLLOCK.  3d. 


THE  LEAGUE 
DEMOCRATI 
MURRAY.  6d.  _ 


THE  LEAGUE 

By  Professor 

THE  LEAGUI 

By  the    Rt,  !_ 
3d.  net. 


THE     LEAGU 
DOM   OF   T 

3d.  net 


THE  LEAGU: 

TIVE  PEOPJ 


OXFOB 
HU 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 

AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


SEP    26  1940 


23 1942E 


)QT  2 

wuvl 


23  1946 


201946 


MAY  1  2  21 


Gaylord  Bros. 

Make  s 

Syracuse,  N.  Y, 
PAT.  JAM.  2 1.1808 


S89267 

HSSTORy  I 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


